Active and passive : Two ways party systems influence electoral outcomes by Nemcok, Miroslav
1 
 
 
 
Active and Passive: Two Ways Party Systems 
Influence Electoral Outcomes 
 
 
Miroslav Nemčok 
University of Helsinki 
Masaryk University 
 
 
Abstract: Parties can not only actively adjust the electoral rules to reach more favourable 
outcomes, as is most often recognized in political science, but they also passively create an 
environment that systematically influences electoral competition. This link is theorized and 
included in the wider framework capturing the mutual dependence between electoral systems and 
party systems. The impact of passive influence is successfully tested on one out of two factors 
closely related to party systems: choice set size (i.e. number of options provided to voters) and 
degree of ideological polarization. The research utilizes established datasets (i.e. Constituency-
Level Elections Archive, Party System Polarization Index, Chapel Hill Expert Survey, and 
Manifesto Project Database) and via regression analysis with clustered robust standard errors 
concludes that the choice set size constitutes an attribute with passive influence over electoral 
systems. Thus, it must be reflected when outcomes of electoral systems are estimated or compared 
across various contexts.  
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Introduction 
The relationship between parties (grouped into party systems) and electoral systems is often 
perceived as a cyclical connection. In one direction, electoral systems transform votes into seats 
and determine representation of parties in an assembly (Duverger, 1954; Shugart, 2005). In the 
other direction, parties may exercise their power over electoral legislation and transform electoral 
rules with the intention to reach more favourable outcomes (Taagepera, 2003; Colomer, 2005, 
2018). 
However, the latter connection describing the influence of parties over electoral systems is 
only part of the story. Parties can not only actively adjust the electoral rules to nudge voters into 
choices that can increase their electoral shares; but they also passively, with no intention, create an 
environment that has a systematic impact on voters’ behaviour and subsequently influence 
electoral outcomes (see figure 1). For example, overcrowded party systems can become a 
cognitively overwhelming factor which may cause voters to fail to respond to strategic incentives 
in the way intended by the designers of the electoral rules. 
This research aims to bring this conceptual addition to the relationship between parties and 
electoral systems and empirically confirm its influence. The paper examines two integral attributes 
of party systems – choice set size and degree of ideological polarization – which represent two 
substantively different approaches describing party systems. While choice set size focuses on an 
aggregated quantitative description of a party system, ideological polarization aims to do the same, 
however from the qualitative perspective. 
On the side of electoral systems, the research employs the predictive logical models 
developed by Taagepera (2007). His predictive models use only two institutional variables – 
country's average district magnitude (𝑀) and its assembly size (𝑆) – to predict the largest party 
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seat share and effective number of legislative parties. These predictions are used as a benchmark 
for given institutional settings and the research examines whether the selected attributes of party 
systems are associated with increasing differences between the real electoral outcomes and their 
predicted values based on Taagepera’s models. 
The passive influence of party systems is tested on data included in several acknowledged 
datasets: Constituency-Level Elections Archive (CLEA) (Kollman et al., 2014), the Manifestos 
Project Database (Lehmann et al., 2017), Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al., 2012), and 
Party System Polarization Index (Dalton, 2008, 2017). Based on the results, this research 
concludes that the choice set size constitutes a relevant attribute of party systems that is passively 
influencing the outcomes of electoral systems. The second attribute, degree of ideological 
polarization, was not confirmed as influential. Nevertheless, the former factor must be taken into 
account when estimating the outcomes of electoral systems, predicting the impact of electoral 
reforms, or comparing them across various contexts. 
This paper has the following structure: it first reviews the literature related to the two 
selected attributes of party systems and formulates the expectations about their passive influence 
on electoral outcomes. The subsequent part presents the data sources and measures used in the 
research. Lastly, the analytical part presents the results, which are followed by the discussion and 
conclusions. 
 
Interactions between party systems and electoral systems 
The links between party systems and electoral systems have previously been studied from both 
sides, and parties as well as electoral rules have been perceived as a cause and as a consequence 
of each other. In one direction, the institutional setup of an electoral system is expected to have 
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mechanical and psychological effects on voters’ behaviour which in turn influences the shape of 
the party system (Duverger, 1954). This rather institutionalist approach grew into the “Duvergerian 
agenda” (Shugart, 2005) and remains very influential in political science today.  
However, several authors turned the dependence of party systems on electoral systems 
upside down. Rokkan (1968) argued that this casual sequence, which treats electoral systems as 
cause and party systems as consequence, makes little sense in many cases when party strategists 
intentionally adjust the electoral legislation when aiming to consolidate the power of their own 
party. This claim was empirically supported by e.g., Lijphart and Grofman (1984) and Colomer 
(2005), with the latter study concluding that “it is the number of parties that can explain the choice 
of electoral systems, rather than the other way around” (Colomer, 2005, p. 1). Taagepera (2003, p. 
5) also spotted a “causality following […] from the number of parties towards electoral rules” and 
therefore proposed a cyclical scheme that incorporates the impact of electoral systems and party 
systems in both directions (Taagepera, 2007, pp. 3–4). 
The black part in figure 1 represents the mutual dependence of party systems and electoral 
systems as it is often described in the literature (for review, see Colomer, 2018), however the grey 
dashed arrow has not been included in this theoretical framework so far. The lower part captures 
approach based on Duverger’s work, which focuses on voters casting ballots to electoral systems 
that subsequently influences the shape of the party system.1 The upper black part captures the 
active influence of parties on electoral systems, which is based on the authors who turned 
 
1 It should be added that the literature includes also predominantly institutionalist works focused directly 
on institutional setups of electoral systems and their impact on party systems while paying negligible 
attention to voters’ behaviour and decision-making. 
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Duverger’s law upside down and documented that parties also actively modify electoral law with 
an intention to influence voters’ behaviour and increase their electoral gains. 
 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual distinction between active and passive influence of party systems on 
electoral outcomes  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This paper claims that the black part of the scheme is not a sufficient description of the 
relationship between electoral systems and political parties. The reason is that it omits the passive 
influence included in figure 1 as a grey dashed line. Passive influence is a tendency of party 
systems to unintentionally, but systematically, influence voters’ behaviour through some of their 
characteristics (such as size or ideological polarization). For example, too many options provided 
to voters can become overwhelming and result in an increasing abstention (e.g., Taagepera, Selb 
and Grofman, 2014) or decrease of correct voting (Cunow, 2014; Muraoka and Barceló, 2017). 
The fact is that some findings included in comparative studies of electoral systems indicate that 
party systems have this kind of passive influence on voters behaviour (Dalton, 2008; Karp and 
Banducci, 2008), however, they have not been incorporated into a coherent theoretical framework. 
That is done by this study. The proposed conceptual framework allows to systematically 
acknowledge the passive effects that may increase the ability of political science to accurately 
Passive influence 
Voters Electoral systems Party systems 
Active influence 
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predict consequences of electoral reforms, which has been so far rather low (Farrell, 2010; Bowler 
and Donovan, 2013). 
The concept of passive influence of party systems, as described here, may resemble the 
indirect effects of electoral systems from the political science literature. However, they both have 
different theoretical underpinnings. When literature speaks about the indirect effects of electoral 
systems, it usually sees a linear sequence starting at voters casting a ballot via electoral system 
which directly determines sizes of parties and indirectly influence other aspects related to 
performance of political systems (Norris, 2004; Lijphart, 2012). Alternatively, the studies focus 
primarily on electoral systems, irrespective of how voters cast their votes, and examine how their 
institutional setup influence number and ideological dispersion of parties (Cox, 1997; Taagepera, 
2007). If we stay on the grounds of party systems, the two major topics in both of these streams in 
the literature are impact on ideological positions of parties (e.g., Cox, 1990; Dow, 2011; Adams, 
2012; Curini and Hino, 2012), and quality of representation (e.g., Cox, 1997, pp. 225–237; Powell 
and Vanberg, 2000; Ezrow, 2010; Kim, Powell, Jr. and Fording, 2010). However, the list goes on 
and disperses into numerous other areas of political science. In contrast to that, passive influence 
firstly recognizes that party systems may acquire a specific set of attributes. These conjointly create 
a context in which voters’ decision-making takes place. That brings party systems back to voters 
(see figure 1). As a result of the passive influence, an identical voter may behave differently in two 
different contexts imposed by party systems with two different sets of attributes. 
The paper examines the passive influence of two substantively different attributes of party 
systems – their size and ideological range – which are briefly introduced here and further discussed 
below. This selection includes an aggregated quantitative, and an aggregated qualitative 
descriptive attribute of party systems which are frequently used in the political science literature. 
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Therefore, this study tackles the broad agenda of studying interactions between parties and 
electoral systems and suggests the direction for future steps. 
The first selected attribute is a quantitative one and it measures the number of options  
provided to voters on the ballot, also known as a “choice set size” (Cunow, 2014). It builds on 
classical works by Blondel (1968, 1990) and Sartori (1997), who noticed that party systems 
consisting of a comparable number of parties also reveal comparable features and could be 
categorized together. However, when political scientists count parties, they often use the effective 
number of parties as proposed by Laakso and Taagepera (1979). Unfortunately, this quantity is 
non-intuitive and quite distant from a regular voter. Therefore, this study focuses on the number 
of options directly included on the ballot, which is a quantity directly interacting with voters during 
an electoral act. 
The second attribute is a more qualitative characteristic of party systems and measures their 
degree of ideological polarization. It is included because a solely quantitative measure does not 
sufficiently capture the dilemmas faced by voters when making an electoral choice. An increasing 
number of parties can, but does not have to, increase the ideological polarization of a party system 
(Cox, 1997; Dalton, 2008), which would determine how cognitively difficult it is for voters to 
distinguish between electoral alternatives (Cunow, 2014, p. 10). Thus, the degree of polarization 
may influence voters’ decision-making processes and subsequently their electoral behaviour.  
 
Choice set size: Number of options provided to voters 
When turnout is discussed, the options provided to voters are perceived as an important 
determinant of voter participation (Franklin, 2004; Blais, 2006; Blais and Aarts, 2006; Geys, 
2006). In general, a wide range of options and fewer wasted votes are considered to be the main 
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reasons why elections under proportional representation (PR) electoral systems stimulate voters to 
higher participation rates (Lijphart, 1999; Karp, 2012). However, this effect works only to a certain 
degree. When voters are provided with too many options, the need to follow the electoral 
competition becomes overwhelming and voters’ high level of confusion results in their abstention 
from voting (Grofman and Selb, 2011; Taagepera, Selb and Grofman, 2014; Muraoka and Barceló, 
2017). 
An analogous situation applies to voting itself. On one hand, PR systems are perceived as 
the more permissive ones because they allow more parties to enter a system. Increasing number of 
parties is expected to allow representation of a wider array of societal groups and their demands 
what simultaneously increases representativity of the elected assemblies as well as governments 
and implemented policies (Powell, 2000; Persson and Tabellini, 2005; Carey and Hix, 2011). On 
the other hand, every electoral system expects a certain degree of strategic coordination among 
voters in response to institutional constrains (Taagepera and Shugart, 1989; Cox, 1997). The 
coordination ensures that voters can effectively utilize their participation in the elections and 
communicate their preferences to the political system (Bawn, 1999; Cox and Schoppa, 2002). 
However, with too many options available, the electoral environment becomes too complex and 
cognitively too demanding for an efficient strategic coordination among voters (Cunow, 2014; 
O’Brien, 2017). At the end of the day, participating voters may cast their ballots inconsistently 
with the behaviour expected by the designers of the electoral system and the system may thus fail 
to deliver expected outcomes. 
Research in psychology and in consumer choice suggests that an abundance of options can 
lead people to select simpler options which are in fact suboptimal choices (Iyengar and Kamenica, 
2010; O’Brien, 2017). Moreover, large choice sets can result in complete avoidance of the 
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decision-making process, because people aim to avoid possible regret which could result from a 
suboptimal selection (Iyengar and Lepper, 2000; Schwartz et al., 2002). In line with this logic, 
elections with too many options “may thus lead many voters to avoid participating entirely and 
may lead others to make voting errors” (Cunow, 2014, p. 3). 
Given the direct connection between cognitive capacity, electoral systems, and voters’ 
behaviour, it is surprising that the issue of designing electoral systems with respect to cognitive 
demands has received only limited attention in political science (Carey and Hix, 2011, p. 6). A few 
studies on this topic have discovered that the presence of a third candidate in the American 
presidential elections increases shares of incorrect voting (Lau and Redlawsk, 1997; Lau, 
Andersen and Redlawsk, 2008) and a different number of candidates may change heuristics that 
people rely on while making their electoral decisions (Lau and Redlawsk, 2001; O’Brien, 2017). 
In addition, several electoral studies have examined the capability of voters to comprehend 
the more complex electoral mechanisms (i.e., mixed electoral systems) emerging during the 1990s 
(see e.g., Banducci, Karp and Vowles, 1998; Bawn, 1999; Gschwend, Johnston and Pattie, 2003; 
Karp, 2006). Their conclusions are mostly in line with Shugart and Wattenberg (2003, p. 592), 
who claim that “mixed-member systems […] are not necessarily more complex than many other 
frequently employed systems,” however, these studies examined voters’ ability to understand 
complicated institutional setup, not voters’ decision-making embedded in a complex electoral 
environment. 
Thus, it remains a question whether increasing choice set size (as a reflection of increasing 
party system size) operates only on the individual level or whether it may become a force strong 
enough to systematically alter the outcomes of an electoral system. Therefore, based on the 
literature discussed, the following expectation is proposed: 
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Choice set size hypothesis: For a given set of electoral rules, increasing the choice set size 
(i.e., the number of options provided to voters on the ballot) increases the difference 
between real party system fragmentation and its expected value. 
 
Polarization of a party system 
Choice set size is a good quantitative indicator that captures how many options a voter has to 
consider before making an electoral decision. However, it does not reveal reliable qualitative 
information about the demands for arriving at the decision. Therefore, in addition to the number 
of options, one has to consider the density and range of ideological space occupied by parties 
(Sartori, 1976; Dalton, 2008). A decreasing number of parties in the same ideological space 
increases the ideological differences between the parties (Cox, 1997; Persson and Tabellini, 2005) 
and makes it easier for a voter to distinguish between alternatives (Cunow, 2014; O’Brien, 2017). 
Lau et al. (2014, p. 257) examined the levels of correct voting across various contexts and 
concluded that the “greater ideological distinctiveness among the competing parties or candidates 
[is] associated with higher levels of correct voting.” 
Therefore, too many ideologically overlapping parties packed within a narrow ideological 
space makes it more demanding for a voter to distinguish among candidates included in the choice 
set and select the closest alternative. This significantly increases the demands for efficient strategic 
coordination among voters and allows the electoral system to result in fragmentation that deviates 
from expectations for the given set of electoral rules. The votes could end up being split among 
ideologically overlapping candidates, which obviously increases the fragmentation of electoral 
results, even when it is expected that electoral rules keep the fragmentation low.  
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I follow the findings by Cox (1997) and Persson and Tabellinni (2005), who concluded 
that the overall degree of polarization already influences the ideological distance between subjects 
present in a system. Based on this assumption and the literature discussed, the research assumes 
following:  
 
Polarization hypothesis: For a given set of electoral rules, increasing ideological 
polarization of a party system, while keeping the choice set size constant, increases the 
difference between real party system fragmentation and its expected value. 
 
If at least one of the hypotheses is confirmed, the research may conclude that the passive 
influence of party systems plays a role in shaping the electoral outcomes. Therefore, the passive 
influence should be considered when electoral outcomes or consequences of electoral reforms are 
estimated or compared across various contexts. 
 
Data and methods 
The biggest challenge for the methodology of this research is the construction of the dependent 
variable. Since this paper examines the effects of the two above-mentioned factors on the resulting 
fragmentation of electoral outcomes, this research needs to compare the actual fragmentation of 
these outcomes to their expected value. This is accomplished in two steps: First, a suitable 
conceptual framework needs to be found which can provide a benchmark, i.e., an expected value 
of fragmentation of electoral outcomes for a given set of electoral rules. Second, the research needs 
to develop an appropriate way to compare this quantitative prediction to the actual electoral (i.e., 
empirical) outcomes. 
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Taagepera (2007) carried out relevant work in quantifying the expectations we have of 
electoral systems. His core contribution to electoral studies is the Seat Product. This consists of 
two main variables – a country's average district magnitude (𝑀) and its assembly size (𝑆). Based 
on these two variables, Taagepera (2007, 2018) develops a series of “quantitatively predictive 
logical models” which estimate the effects of electoral systems to a surprisingly accurate degree. 
The ability of these models to predict empirical outcomes was successfully documented by 
Taagepera (2007), Li and Shugart (2016), and Shugart and Taagepera (2017). 
This research uses two models that are directly connected to the party systems – one 
predicting the largest party seat share, and the second predicting the effective number of legislative 
parties. The first model predicts the seat share of the largest party elected to the assembly (s1̂).
2 
Taagepera (2007, pp. 122, 138–139) argues and empirically proves that the best estimation of the 
largest party seat share is equal to the inverse 8th root of the product of 𝑀 and 𝑆 (i.e., Seat Product)3: 
 
s1̂ =
1
(𝑀𝑆)1 8⁄
= (𝑀𝑆)−1 8⁄  
 
 
2 Largest party seat share is a useful quantity that can indicate relevant information about the stability of a 
system. If the largest party is expected to gain more than 50% of the seats, the system should be stable, 
because the largest party has enough seats to sufficiently support its single-party cabinet. Even if the 
expected largest party seat share is below 50%, the value gives a helpful hint about the largest party’s weight 
in the coalition or its blocking ability in the opposition.  
3 Both of Taagepera’s models are properly defended on logical grounds and presented in Taagepera (2007, 
pp. 115–164). Unfortunately, the space constraints do not allow to present the logic here. However, 
Taagepera’s logic is also effectively summarized by Li and Shugart (2016, pp. 26–27) or Shugart and 
Taagepera (2018). 
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The second model predicts the effective number of parties with legislative representation 
(Nŝ).
4 Taagepera (2007, p. 152) successfully empirically tests the model which states that the best 
estimation of Nŝ is equal to the sixth root of Seat Product: 
 
Nŝ = (𝑀𝑆)
1 6⁄  
 
Even though Taagepera (2007, pp. 23–46) originally advised that the logical models work 
only for simple electoral systems, the later work by Shugart and Taagepera (2017, pp. 285–307) 
observed that they also work satisfactorily for complex systems, just with larger random scatter. 
Therefore, this research is based on all cases included in the below-specified datasets and treats 
them as if they were simple systems.5 Excluded are only elections in countries with electoral 
systems for which the average district magnitude 𝑀 cannot be computed unambiguously. This is 
mostly the case of mixed electoral systems with two overlapping tiers (see Shugart and 
Wattenberg, 2003). Depending on the data availability of electoral results and different 
polarization statistics, individual parts of the analysis examine between 52 elections (available in 
 
4 Nŝ refers to the effective number of parliamentary/seat-winning parties. For the formula see Laakso and 
Taagepera (1979). 
5 It has to be mentioned that Li and Shugart (2016) and Shugart and Taagepera (2017, pp. 285–307) develop 
an extension of Seat Product for complex electoral systems. However, its additional parameter requires to 
input upper-tier seat share (i.e., seats allocated regionally or nationwide rather than in local districts). This 
information is hardly available for significant portion of systems included in the datasets utilized in this 
study. Therefore, implementation of the extension would result in extensive exclusion of cases, while 
benefits of such action would nevertheless remain uncertain. The reason is that the Seat Product Models 
work fine for some complex systems. For the rest, they still provide reasonable predictions (Shugart and 
Taagepera, 2017, p. 306).  
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the Chapel Hill Expert Survey database) and 221 elections (available in the Constituency-Level 
Elections Archive). The elections were conducted between 1945 and 2016 around the globe (see 
Online appendix A for the list of included elections). 
It must be noted that Taagepera’s quantitatively predictive logical models serve first and 
foremost as a benchmark estimating the largest party seat share and the effective number of 
legislative parties for given institutional setup of an electoral system without considering any other 
forces that could potentially influence electoral outcomes (Shugart and Taagepera, 2017, pp. 113–
114; Taagepera, 2018, p. 5). That being said, they are not supposed to be perfectly accurate 
predictions about party system fragmentation, “but all others are worse” (Taagepera, 2007, p. 47). 
Nevertheless, they are sufficiently precise estimations about the expected value of the effective 
number of parties or the largest party seat share, when very little information about the electoral 
system is available. 
Now, when the benchmark is set, it is time to approach the second step in the development 
of dependent variable and find a suitable way to compare real and expected party system 
fragmentation. This measure would allow to examine whether two selected characteristics of party 
systems are associated with cases when fragmentation in electoral results is substantively different 
from the expected value. 
I follow the approach presented and successfully empirically tested by Nemčok and Šedo 
(2018), who divide real electoral outcome (i.e., largest party seat share or effective number of seat-
winning parties) by the theoretical prediction based on one of the logical models (i.e., (𝑀𝑆)−1 8⁄  
or (𝑀𝑆)1 6⁄ , respectively). The reason for using division instead of subtraction is that the largest 
party seat shares as well as effective number of parties can vary greatly across various systems. If 
a prediction is off by one party in a five-party system, it is still a decent estimation because it 
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nonetheless deals with a category of multiparty systems. However, in case of a two-party system 
it would be a much bigger failure, because such a prediction left the grounds of bipartisan systems. 
Additionally, they apply a logarithm that reflects the non-linear development of the product 
when 𝑀 and 𝑆 are multiplied (as proven on numerous places by Taagepera and Shugart, 1993; 
Taagepera, 2007, pp. 115–164; Shugart and Taagepera, 2017, pp. 101–108). The logarithm 
straightens the trend what makes the values of 𝑑𝑠1  and 𝑑𝑁𝑠 presented below more intuitive for 
interpretation. Finally, the analysis examines the results in their absolute values; as it aims to 
identify the influence of party system characteristics on the inability of an electoral system to 
deliver expected outcomes. Whether a system delivers outcomes which under or above a prediction 
is less relevant at this point.6 
 
|𝑑𝑠1| = log[𝑠1 (𝑀𝑆)
−1 8⁄⁄ ] 
|𝑑𝑁𝑠| = log[𝑁𝑠 (𝑀𝑆)
1 6⁄⁄ ] 
 
Theoretically, the values of |𝑑𝑠1| and |𝑑𝑁𝑠| can range from zero to infinity.
7 However, there 
are two arbitrary values that can help grasp the meaning of a value generated by the formulas 
specified above. The first one is zero. As has been already mentioned above, every electoral system 
expects at least some degree of voters’ strategic coordination in response to the institutional 
constrains (Taagepera and Shugart, 1989; Cox, 1997). Therefore, if voters coordinate successfully, 
 
6 Transformation to absolute values is also motivated by practical reasons, since the use of non-
transformed values would increase complexity of the analysis to unnecessary degree. 
7 Even though a value of 𝑑𝑁𝑠 = 3 would already mean that there are 1,000 parties in a system for which the 
quantitatively predictive logical model predicts only one party. 
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real and predicted values are equal and the result of their division is one. That, after the logarithm 
is applied, gives zero. Therefore, when |𝑑𝑠1| or |𝑑𝑁𝑠| is equal to zero, the voters’ coordination 
resulted in electoral outcomes (i.e., party system fragmentation and largest party seat share) which 
perfectly meets the expectations based on the given set of electoral rules.  
The second value is 0.3. This value signals that the real outcome stays within a factor of 
two from the prediction.8 In other words, the real electoral outcome is half of the expected or twice 
the expected. If the value of |𝑑𝑠1| or |𝑑𝑁𝑠| reaches 0.3, it indicates that voters elected as few as two 
or as many as eight parties to a system which institutional setup is expected to accommodate four 
parties.9 Therefore, the voters’ strategies did not properly respond to the incentives imposed by 
institutional constrains and resulted in a party system which is considerably less or considerably 
more fragmentated than expected. This value is set with respect to the empirical testing conducted 
by Taagepera (2007, pp. 123, 153), which revealed that most cases included in his dataset fall 
within this interval. 
These values add a substantive meaning to the indices. At zero, they indicate that the real 
outcomes are perfectly consistent with the predictions. Increasing values of |𝑑𝑠1| and |𝑑𝑁𝑠| indicate 
growing deviation between real and expected party systems fragmentation for the given set of 
electoral rules. However, the value of 0.3 limits the interval of “tolerable” deviations. If a value of 
|𝑑𝑠1| or |𝑑𝑁𝑠| exceeds 0.3, it means that the case strongly deviates from theoretical expectations. 
 
 
8 To stay within a factor of two means that the result is within the interval bounded by numbers if the 
predicted value is multiplied or divided by two.   
9 It should be emphasized that these counts are effective numbers of parties which are quantities always 
smaller than the actual number of parties present in a system. 
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Operationalization of party systems’ characteristics  
Choice set size is a measure which sums up the number of all parties/candidates receiving at least 
one vote in a district based on the Constituency-Level Elections Archive (CLEA) (Kollman et al., 
2014).10 However, the CLEA provides data on the level of constituencies, while this research 
operates on the level of individual national elections. Therefore, this research employs the 
aggregated measure which is a weighted average of the number of parties running in the districts 
with weights being the district magnitudes. 
In response to this, a possible objection could be that the actual national number of parties 
should be used instead of weighted average, because it constitutes a more valid measure. That may 
be true for systems which apply similar district magnitudes across the country. However, the 
magnitude varies greatly in countries like Denmark (2 to 20), Spain (1 to 16), or Switzerland (1 to 
18). In these cases, national number would overestimate the number of options offered in the 
districts with low magnitude where smaller parties resign to run. Weighted average reflects this 
and therefore constitutes a more suitable measure expressing the overall cognitive demands for 
voters in these elections. At the same time, weighted average produces comparable results to the 
actual national number of parties running in the elections, if the system applies comparable 
magnitude across its districts. 
Degree of polarization is operationalized in three different ways which altogether utilize 
three out of four methods known in political science to position parties within a political space 
(Laver, 2014). The first approach takes the position of parties from the Manifesto Project Database 
 
10 I could not include candidates who received zero votes, because those are excluded from the CLEA 
dataset. Nevertheless, it is hard to imagine that the number of irrelevant candidates receiving zero votes 
could be high enough to result in a bias and alter the results. 
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(Lehmann et al., 2017). It places the parties on the left-right dimension based on the saliency of 
specific issues in the parties’ manifestos, which are analysed by trained coders who follow a strict 
methodology (see Budge et al., 2001; Klingemann et al., 2006). In this case, the degree of 
polarization is equal to the distance between the two most remote subjects11 on the left-right 
(RILE) scale supplied directly by the Manifesto Project team (Budge et al., 2001, p. 22). The 
theoretical range of this measure starts from zero (i.e., no polarization because the most distant 
parties occupy the same position) to 200 (i.e., extreme polarization, because the most distant 
parties occupy opposite edges of the RILE scale).12 
The second measure captures the position of parties on the general left-right scale as they 
were coded by experts participating in the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Hooghe et al., 2010; Bakker 
et al., 2012; Polk et al., 2017). Given the fact that experts assess individual parties, also in this 
case the measure represents the distance between the two most remote parties. The theoretical 
range starts at zero (i.e., no polarization, because the most distant parties occupy the same position) 
and goes up to 10 (i.e., extreme polarization, because the most distant parties occupy opposite 
extremes of the general left-right scale).  
 
11 Degree of polarization could be computed from ideological position of parties in several ways: (1) 
distance between most extreme parties, (2) spatial distribution of parties measured by standard deviation, 
and (3) voter-weighted measures. Each approach has its own benefits and shortcomings. Nevertheless, Kim, 
Powell, and Fording (2010, p. 184) found out that when it comes to links between electoral systems, party 
systems, and ideological representation, all measures yield essentially the same results. Therefore, this 
research employs only one of the measures. 
12 Methodology of the Manifesto Project focuses on issue salience rather than party positions, therefore, 
validity of the RILE scale has been a subject of ongoing debates (e.g., Gabel and Huber, 2000; Laver and 
Garry, 2000; Dinas and Gemenis, 2010).  
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The third measure is the Party System Polarization Index proposed by Dalton (2008, 2010), 
which is based on the perception of party positions by voters captured in the Comparative Study 
of Electoral Systems (Dalton, 2017). Dalton’s formula (2008) is designed in a way that captures 
the degree of polarization present in a given system, therefore no aggregation is needed in this 
case. Party System Polarization Index can range from 0 (i.e., no polarization) to 10 (i.e., fully 
polarized system). 
 
Controls 
The explanatory variables mentioned above are clearly not exogenous. Therefore, the regressions 
include a set of factors which control possible confounders. 
In political science, district magnitude (i.e., the number of seats distributed in a district) is 
considered a key variable determining the effects of electoral systems (Rae, 1995). The growing 
number of seats divided among parties increases proportionality and fragmentation of electoral 
outcomes and changes the incentives for voters to cast their ballot strategically (i.e., for other than 
their sincere preference) in order to avoid wasting one’s vote (Taagepera and Shugart, 1989; Cox 
and Shugart, 1996; Cox, 1997). Since the district magnitude may impact voters and subsequently 
electoral outcomes, the analysis controls for average district magnitude which is the number of 
assembly seats divided by the number of electoral districts for given elections in a country. 
The longer the period spent under the democratic rules, the more learning opportunities 
voters have to familiarize the democratic institutions and act according to the strategic incentives 
the institutions generate (see e.g., Kitschelt, 1995; Aarts and Thomassen, 2008). This is the reason 
why the analysis controls for democratic development and length of democratic tradition. Both are 
based on the index of institutionalized democracy (i.e., e_democ) included in the V-Dem dataset 
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(Coppedge et al., 2018), which ranges from 0 (least democratic) to 10 (most democratic) and 
reflects the Polity IV data. The democratic development uses the respective value for the election 
year in a country. The length of democratic tradition counts the number of years before the election 
during which the index was six or higher. 
Several scholars claim that the resulting fragmentation of party systems is conditional on 
social cleavages present in a country (Ordeshook and Shvetsova, 1994; Neto and Cox, 1997; Clark 
and Golder, 2006; Golder and Lloyd, 2014). Therefore, the models include the index of ethnic 
fractionalization developed by Alesina et al. (2003) who transform the data from the Encyclopædia 
Britannica into an overall measure for 215 countries which range in theory from 0 (ethnically 
homogeneous country) to 1 (ethnically heterogeneous country). 
Clarke et al. (1999) and Norris (2004) noticed that the economic situation has an influence 
over the cleavage voting in countries. The reason is that the level of economic development 
determines the shift from industrial to postindustrial stage. Therefore, the analysis controls also 
for the GDP per capita as reported by the Maddison Project Database (2018) included in the V-
Dem data (as variable “e_migdppc”) (Coppedge et al., 2018).  
The analysis employs regression with clustered robust standard errors (clusters being the 
countries), which is supposed to reduce the bias resulting from the fact that the available data often 
includes multiple elections from one country (see Online appendix A for list of included elections). 
 
Analysis 
This analysis first examines the effect of choice set size, i.e., the number of options provided to 
voters during elections. The results presented in table 1 show that the coefficients for the choice 
set size are positive and highly statistically significant. These results are robust to the inclusion of 
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the control variables (see models 2 and 4 in table 1) and their alternative operationalizations (see 
table B.1 and B.2 in online appendix B). This confirms the choice set size hypothesis which expect 
that an increasing number of options provided to voters causes the fragmentation in electoral 
outcomes to deviate from theoretical expectations to a greater degree. However, the effect is non-
linear. The most suitable function capturing the trend in the data is a natural logarithm, which 
means that every additional option included on the ballot has a smaller effect when the overall size 
of the ballot increases. The trendline for |𝑑𝑠1| and |𝑑𝑁𝑠| is visualized in figure 2. 
 
 
Table 1. The effect of increasing choice set size on fragmentation of electoral outcomes 
 Dependent variable: 
 |𝒅𝒔𝟏| |𝒅𝑵𝒔| 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Weighted average number of 
options (ln) 
0.034*** 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.046*** 
(0.010) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) 
Average district magnitude  -0.0003  -0.0003* 
 
 (0.0002)  (0.0002) 
Democratic development  0.001  -0.008 
 
 (0.006)  (0.006) 
Length of democratic tradition  -0.0001  0.0001 
 (0.0002)  (0.0003) 
GDP per capita  -0.00000  -0.00000 
 
 (0.00000)  (0.00000) 
Ethnic fractionalization 
(Alesina et al., 2003) 
 0.009  0.010 
 (0.049)  (0.057) 
Constant 0.021 0.035 0.018 0.093 
 
(0.020) (0.068) (0.027) (0.071) 
Observations 221 221 221 221 
R2 0.129 0.173 0.160 0.208 
Adjusted R2 0.125 0.149 0.156 0.185 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; Regression with clustered robust standard errors in parentheses 
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These results demonstrate that the choice set size of ten is already associated with a 
deviation of roughly 0.1 for both |𝑑𝑠1| and |𝑑𝑁𝑠|. Substantively speaking, this means that in the 
systems for which the largest party seat share is predicted to be 40%, the largest party tends to get 
about 32% or 50% seats instead when voters are provided with ten options. In case of effective 
number of parties, systems which are supposed to consist of five parties tend to include four or 
6.25 effective parties instead if the choice set size is ten.13 Given the natural log transformation of 
the choice set size, its effect slows down after surpassing the value ten (see figure 2). When the 
choice set size increases and voters are offered 30 options, the deviation expressed by indices |𝑑𝑠1| 
and |𝑑𝑁𝑠| also increases to about 0.15. This means that if a system is predicted to include largest 
party with a seat share of 40%, the choice set size of 30 tend to divert this share to around 28% or 
56%. When it comes to the effective number of parties, such a system tends to contain 3.5 or seven 
effective parties instead of the predicted value of five. These interpretations demonstrate that 
increasing choice set size influence the shape of party systems and contribute to their diversion 
from theoretically expected outcomes. 
This finding is in line with the studies focused on individuals (i.e., on the micro level), 
which discovered that an increasing choice set size increases cognitive demands for voters and 
results in a growing confusion (Lau, Andersen and Redlawsk, 2008; Cunow, 2014; O’Brien, 2017). 
The consequences of this confusion could also be observed on the level of the whole system: If 
voters are offered too many options, their ability to strategically coordinate in line with the 
 
13 Here it should be emphasized again that these values represent effective number of parties which is always 
smaller than the actual number of parties in a system. Therefore, the differences in counts of parties would 
be even larger. 
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expectations of electoral system designers decreases and the fragmentation in electoral outcomes 
is further away from what a typical outcome is for a given set of electoral rules.  
 
 
Figure 2. Visualization of the effect of increasing choice set size on fragmentation of electoral 
outcomes 
 
 
 
Now, the analysis turns to the second part. It examines the indirect influence of party 
system polarization on electoral outcomes. As previously noted in the theoretical part, increasing 
polarization (while keeping the number of parties constant) should expand the ideological 
differences between candidates, which makes it easier for voters to distinguish candidates taking 
part in the same political competition (Cox, 1997; Persson and Tabellini, 2005). Therefore, 
increasing polarization should reduce the cognitive demands for voter coordination and simplify 
the competent response to the strategic incentive generated by an electoral system. As mentioned 
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above, the effect of polarization expects that the number of parties is kept constant, therefore, each 
measure of party system polarization is always included in the regression models 5 to 16 together 
with weighted choice set size (see table 2). 
The coefficients capturing the effect of polarization are mostly negative, which is in line 
with the expectations, however, none of them passes the threshold for statistical significance (see 
table 2). Therefore, these findings do not support the polarization hypothesis that increasing 
polarization helps voters to follow the political competition and to more efficiently respond to 
strategic incentives generated by the electoral system.  
It can be argued that political science has several competing concepts of ideological 
polarization. Indeed. This research employed three out of four methodological approaches to 
measure ideological polarization (see Laver, 2014) and revealed pairwise correlations ranging 
between r=0.34 and r=0.60.14 This indicates that all three measures conceptually overlap to only 
some degree, yet none of them capture any systematic influence of party system polarization on 
the overall degree of electoral fragmentation on the macro level. 
 
14 The correlations are r = 0.34 for Party System Polarization Index vs. Manifesto Project, r = 0.35 for Party 
System Polarization Index vs. Chapel Hill Expert Survey, and r = 0.60 for Manifesto Project vs. Chapel 
Hill Expert Survey. All correlations are statistically significant at p<0.01.  
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Table 2. The effect of increasing choice set size on fragmentation of electoral outcomes when polarization is kept constant 
 Dependent variable: 
 |𝒅𝒔𝟏| |𝒅𝑵𝒔| |𝒅𝒔𝟏| |𝒅𝑵𝒔| |𝒅𝒔𝟏| |𝒅𝑵𝒔| 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Manifesto Project -0.0001 0.0002 -0.0003 -0.00002         
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004)         
Chapel Hill  
Expert Survey 
    -0.005 -0.009 -0.008 -0.005     
    (0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.007)     
Party System 
Polarization Index 
        -0.007 -0.006 -0.015 -0.013 
        (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) 
Weighted average 
number of options (ln) 
0.039*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.047*** 0.025*** 0.027*** 0.026*** 0.031*** 0.041*** 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.054*** 
(0.012) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.015) (0.013) (0.017) (0.018) 
Average district 
magnitude 
 -0.0004  -0.0003  0.0003**  -0.0001  0.00000  -0.0001 
 (0.0003)  (0.0002)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0002)  (0.0003) 
Democratic 
development 
 0.002  -0.006  -0.001  0.028  0.026*  0.006 
 (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.014)  (0.014) 
Length of democratic 
tradition 
 -0.0002  0.0001  0.0001  0.00002  0.0004  0.0002 
 (0.0002)  (0.0003)  (0.0002)  (0.0003)  (0.0003)  (0.0003) 
GDP per capita  -0.00000  -0.00000  -0.00000  0.00000  -0.00000*  -0.00000 
 (0.00000)  (0.00000)  (0.00000)  (0.00000)  (0.00000)  (0.00000) 
Ethnic fractionalization 
(Alesina et al., 2003) 
 0.010  0.010  -0.043  0.045  0.067  0.118 
 (0.049)  (0.056)  (0.076)  (0.073)  (0.083)  (0.083) 
Constant 0.019 0.014 0.026 0.080 0.062 0.090 0.078 -0.240 0.013 -0.238 0.028 -0.049 
(0.025) (0.070) (0.032) (0.076) (0.068) (0.240) (0.053) (0.228) (0.047) (0.153) (0.049) (0.162) 
Observations 211 211 211 211 52 52 52 52 55 55 55 55 
R2 0.140 0.177 0.156 0.194 0.120 0.160 0.137 0.192 0.158 0.296 0.237 0.367 
Adjusted R2 0.131 0.149 0.148 0.166 0.084 0.026 0.101 0.064 0.126 0.191 0.208 0.272 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; Regression with clustered robust standard errors in parentheses 
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In addition, measures of ideological polarization included in regression models 5 to 16 
allow to examine the effect of choice set size when polarization is kept constant. All coefficients 
for choice set size are still statistically significant and robust to the inclusion of the control 
variables (see table 2).15 Moreover, the values as well as the trendlines visualizing the effect of 
choice set size are comparable to the results obtained through models 1 to 4 (see figures 2 and 3). 
Therefore, the substantive interpretation of the effect of choice set size presented in the previous 
part of the analysis can be applied here as well. 
This indicates that the influence of choice set size is comparable even when the degree of 
ideological polarization of party systems as well as other possible confounders are held constant. 
Thus, robustness of the results supporting the choice set size hypothesis allows to conclude that 
the choice set size constitutes a relevant factor influencing the performance of electoral systems 
on the macro level. 
 
 
15 Results remain the same even when the alternative operationalization of control variables is used (see 
tables B.3 through B.8 in Online appendix B). In addition to that, this part of the analysis also confirms the 
negligible impact of potential confounders included in the models. 
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Figure 3. Visualization of the (limited) effect of polarization on the relationship between choice set size and fragmentation of electoral 
outcomes 
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Discussion and conclusions 
This paper confirmed that parties can not only directly adjust the electoral rules to reach more 
favourable outcomes, but they also create a context that indirectly and systematically influences 
electoral competition. This conceptual framework constitutes an original theoretical contribution 
to the relationship between parties and electoral systems. It emphasizes that any expectations of 
electoral reforms and any comparisons of electoral systems across various contexts must reflect 
the specific features of the local party system. 
This research examined two factors that capture attributes related to party systems – choice 
set size and degree of ideological polarization. These factors represent two different approaches 
describing party systems – quantitative and qualitative. Based on a range of acknowledged 
measures and data from several credible sources, this research reaches two main conclusions. 
First, increasing the options provided to voters (i.e., choice set size) increases the cognitive 
demands on them to comprehend the political competition (Lau, Andersen and Redlawsk, 2008; 
Cunow, 2014; O’Brien, 2017). As a result, systems with too many parties/candidates experience 
greater fragmentation in electoral outcomes than is expected from the given set of electoral rules. 
This conclusion constitutes a relevant finding for the designers of electoral systems. When 
the outcomes of an electoral reform are estimated, it is also necessary to take into account the costs 
to enter a political competition. If costs are too low and marginal parties are not effectively 
restricted from running, the cognitive demands to follow the political competition increase. As a 
result, a growing number of voters fail to competently respond to strategic incentives generated by 
electoral rules and therefore the number of parties receiving the substantial portion of votes will 
be further away from the theoretically expected value. 
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Second, none of the three different approaches to measuring the party system polarization 
revealed that the range of ideological space occupied by parties have a systematic impact on 
electoral systems and their outcomes. However, it must be emphasized that these results do not 
challenge the conclusions based on micro level observations of individuals (Lau and Redlawsk, 
1997; Lau et al., 2014; O’Brien, 2017). Polarization can still represent a relevant force driving an 
individual’s perception of politics, however, on the macro level, the effect of polarization does not 
seem to be a factor strong enough to substantively alter the overall fragmentation of electoral 
results in a country. 
Future research should aim to quantify the magnitude of impact of choice set size on 
resulting electoral fragmentation. Based on that, it should develop a rigorous methodological tool 
which would allow to take into consideration how choice set size influence performance of various 
electoral systems. This instrument will significantly increase the accuracy when impact of electoral 
reforms is estimated. 
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Online appendix A 
Table A.1. Cases included in the analysis 
Choice Set Size Manifestos Project 
Chapel Hill Expert 
Survey 
Party System 
Polarization Index 
Armenia 2007 Armenia 2007   
Armenia 2012 Armenia 2012   
Australia 1946 Australia 1946   
Australia 1949 Australia 1949   
Australia 1951 Australia 1951   
Australia 1954 Australia 1954   
Australia 1955 Australia 1955   
Australia 1958 Australia 1958   
Australia 1961 Australia 1961   
Australia 1963 Australia 1963   
Australia 1966 Australia 1966   
Australia 1969 Australia 1969   
Australia 1972 Australia 1972   
Australia 1974 Australia 1974   
Australia 1975 Australia 1975   
Australia 1977 Australia 1977   
Australia 1980 Australia 1980   
Australia 1983 Australia 1983   
Australia 1984 Australia 1984   
Australia 1987 Australia 1987   
Australia 1990 Australia 1990   
Australia 1993 Australia 1993   
Australia 1996 Australia 1996  Australia 1996 
Australia 1998 Australia 1998   
Australia 2001 Australia 2001   
Australia 2004 Australia 2004  Australia 2004 
Australia 2007 Australia 2007  Australia 2007 
Australia 2010 Australia 2010   
Australia 2013 Australia 2013  Australia 2013 
Bulgaria 1991 Bulgaria 1991   
Bulgaria 1994 Bulgaria 1994   
Bulgaria 1997 Bulgaria 1997   
Bulgaria 2001 Bulgaria 2001 Bulgaria 2001 Bulgaria 2001 
Bulgaria 2005 Bulgaria 2005 Bulgaria 2005  
Bulgaria 2009 Bulgaria 2009 Bulgaria 2009  
Bulgaria 2013 Bulgaria 2013 Bulgaria 2013  
Bulgaria 2014  Bulgaria 2014 Bulgaria 2014 
Canada 1945 Canada 1945   
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Choice Set Size Manifestos Project 
Chapel Hill Expert 
Survey 
Party System 
Polarization Index 
Canada 1949 Canada 1949   
Canada 1953 Canada 1953   
Canada 1957 Canada 1957   
Canada 1958 Canada 1958   
Canada 1962 Canada 1962   
Canada 1963 Canada 1963   
Canada 1965 Canada 1965   
Canada 1968 Canada 1968   
Canada 1972 Canada 1972   
Canada 1974 Canada 1974   
Canada 1979 Canada 1979   
Canada 1980 Canada 1980   
Canada 1984 Canada 1984   
Canada 1988 Canada 1988   
Canada 1993 Canada 1993   
Canada 1997 Canada 1997  Canada 1997 
Canada 2000 Canada 2000   
Canada 2004 Canada 2004  Canada 2004 
Canada 2006 Canada 2006   
Canada 2008 Canada 2008  Canada 2008 
Canada 2011 Canada 2011  Canada 2011 
Canada 2015 Canada 2015   
Croatia 2007 Croatia 2007  Croatia 2007 
Czech Republic 1990 Czech Republic 1990   
Czech Republic 1992 Czech Republic 1992   
Czech Republic 1996 Czech Republic 1996  Czech Republic 1996 
Czech Republic 1998 Czech Republic 1998   
Czech Republic 2002 Czech Republic 2002 Czech Republic 2002 Czech Republic 2002 
Czech Republic 2006 Czech Republic 2006 Czech Republic 2006 Czech Republic 2006 
Czech Republic 2010 Czech Republic 2010 Czech Republic 2010 Czech Republic 2010 
Czech Republic 2013 Czech Republic 2013 Czech Republic 2013 Czech Republic 2013 
Denmark 2001 Denmark 2001 Denmark 2001 Denmark 2001 
Denmark 2005 Denmark 2005 Denmark 2005  
Denmark 2007 Denmark 2007 Denmark 2007 Denmark 2007 
Denmark 2011 Denmark 2011 Denmark 2011  
Denmark 2015  Denmark 2015  
Estonia 1992 Estonia 1992   
Estonia 1995 Estonia 1995   
Estonia 1999 Estonia 1999   
Estonia 2003 Estonia 2003   
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Choice Set Size Manifestos Project 
Chapel Hill Expert 
Survey 
Party System 
Polarization Index 
Estonia 2007 Estonia 2007 Estonia 2007  
Estonia 2011 Estonia 2011 Estonia 2011 Estonia 2011 
Estonia 2015 Estonia 2015 Estonia 2015  
Finland 1999 Finland 1999 Finland 1999  
Finland 2003 Finland 2003 Finland 2003 Finland 2003 
Finland 2007 Finland 2007 Finland 2007 Finland 2007 
Finland 2011 Finland 2011 Finland 2011 Finland 2011 
Finland 2015  Finland 2015 Finland 2015 
France 1986 France 1986   
France 2007 France 2007 France 2007 France 2007 
France 2012 France 2012 France 2012 France 2012 
Ireland 2002 Ireland 2002 Ireland 2002 Ireland 2002 
Ireland 2007 Ireland 2007 Ireland 2007 Ireland 2007 
Ireland 2011 Ireland 2011 Ireland 2011 Ireland 2011 
Israel 1951 Israel 1951   
Israel 1955 Israel 1955   
Israel 1959 Israel 1959   
Israel 1961 Israel 1961   
Israel 1965 Israel 1965   
Israel 1969 Israel 1969   
Israel 1973 Israel 1973   
Israel 1977 Israel 1977   
Israel 1981 Israel 1981   
Israel 1984 Israel 1984   
Israel 1988 Israel 1988   
Israel 1992 Israel 1992   
Israel 1996 Israel 1996  Israel 1996 
Israel 1999 Israel 1999   
Israel 2003 Israel 2003  Israel 2003 
Israel 2006   Israel 2006 
Israel 2009    
Israel 2013   Israel 2013 
Israel 2015 Israel 2015   
Japan 1960 Japan 1960   
Japan 1963 Japan 1963   
Japan 1967 Japan 1967   
Japan 1969 Japan 1969   
Japan 1972 Japan 1972   
Japan 1976 Japan 1976   
Japan 1979 Japan 1979   
Japan 1980 Japan 1980   
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Choice Set Size Manifestos Project 
Chapel Hill Expert 
Survey 
Party System 
Polarization Index 
Japan 1983 Japan 1983   
Japan 1986 Japan 1986   
Japan 1990 Japan 1990   
Japan 1993 Japan 1993   
Latvia 1998 Latvia 1998   
Latvia 2002 Latvia 2002 Latvia 2002  
Luxembourg 1951 Luxembourg 1951   
Luxembourg 1954 Luxembourg 1954   
Luxembourg 1959 Luxembourg 1959   
Luxembourg 1964 Luxembourg 1964   
Luxembourg 1968 Luxembourg 1968   
Luxembourg 1974 Luxembourg 1974   
Luxembourg 1979 Luxembourg 1979   
Luxembourg 1984 Luxembourg 1984   
Luxembourg 1989 Luxembourg 1989   
Luxembourg 1994 Luxembourg 1994   
Macedonia 2002 Macedonia 2002   
Macedonia 2006 Macedonia 2006   
Macedonia 2008 Macedonia 2008   
Macedonia 2011 Macedonia 2011   
Macedonia 2014 Macedonia 2014   
New Zealand 1946 New Zealand 1946   
New Zealand 1949 New Zealand 1949   
New Zealand 1951 New Zealand 1951   
New Zealand 1954 New Zealand 1954   
New Zealand 1957 New Zealand 1957   
New Zealand 1960 New Zealand 1960   
New Zealand 1963 New Zealand 1963   
New Zealand 1966 New Zealand 1966   
New Zealand 1969 New Zealand 1969   
New Zealand 1972 New Zealand 1972   
New Zealand 1975 New Zealand 1975   
New Zealand 1978 New Zealand 1978   
New Zealand 1981 New Zealand 1981   
New Zealand 1984 New Zealand 1984   
New Zealand 1987 New Zealand 1987   
New Zealand 1990 New Zealand 1990   
New Zealand 1993 New Zealand 1993   
Poland 1991 Poland 1991   
Poland 1997 Poland 1997  Poland 1997 
Poland 2001 Poland 2001 Poland 2001 Poland 2001 
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Choice Set Size Manifestos Project 
Chapel Hill Expert 
Survey 
Party System 
Polarization Index 
Poland 2005 Poland 2005 Poland 2005 Poland 2005 
Poland 2007 Poland 2007 Poland 2007 Poland 2007 
Poland 2011 Poland 2011 Poland 2011 Poland 2011 
Romania 1990 Romania 1990   
Romania 1992 Romania 1992   
Romania 1996 Romania 1996  Romania 1996 
Romania 2000 Romania 2000 Romania 2000  
Slovakia 1998 Slovakia 1998   
Slovakia 2002 Slovakia 2002 Slovakia 2002  
Slovakia 2006 Slovakia 2006 Slovakia 2006  
Slovakia 2010 Slovakia 2010 Slovakia 2010 Slovakia 2010 
Slovakia 2012 Slovakia 2012 Slovakia 2012  
Slovakia 2016  Slovakia 2016 Slovakia 2016 
South Africa 1994 South Africa 1994   
South Africa 1999 South Africa 1999   
South Africa 2004 South Africa 2004   
South Africa 2009 South Africa 2009  South Africa 2009 
South Africa 2014 South Africa 2014  South Africa 2014 
Spain 2000 Spain 2000 Spain 2000 Spain 2000 
Spain 2004 Spain 2004 Spain 2004 Spain 2004 
Spain 2008 Spain 2008 Spain 2008 Spain 2008 
Spain 2011 Spain 2011 Spain 2011  
Spain 2015 Spain 2015 Spain 2015  
Spain 2016  Spain 2016  
Sweden 2002 Sweden 2002 Sweden 2002 Sweden 2002 
Sweden 2010 Sweden 2010 Sweden 2010  
Sweden 2014  Sweden 2014 Sweden 2014 
Switzerland 1999 Switzerland 1999  Switzerland 1999 
Switzerland 2003 Switzerland 2003  Switzerland 2003 
Switzerland 2007 Switzerland 2007  Switzerland 2007 
Switzerland 2011 Switzerland 2011  Switzerland 2011 
Switzerland 2015    
Turkey 1983 Turkey 1983   
Turkey 1987 Turkey 1987   
Turkey 1991 Turkey 1991   
Turkey 1995 Turkey 1995   
Turkey 1999 Turkey 1999   
Turkey 2002 Turkey 2002   
Turkey 2007 Turkey 2007   
Turkey 2011 Turkey 2011  Turkey 2011 
Turkey 2015 (June) Turkey 2015 (June)   
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Choice Set Size Manifestos Project 
Chapel Hill Expert 
Survey 
Party System 
Polarization Index 
Turkey 2015 (November) Turkey 2015 (November)   
United Kingdom 1945 United Kingdom 1945   
United Kingdom 1950 United Kingdom 1950   
United Kingdom 1951 United Kingdom 1951   
United Kingdom 1955 United Kingdom 1955   
United Kingdom 1959 United Kingdom 1959   
United Kingdom 1964 United Kingdom 1964   
United Kingdom 1966 United Kingdom 1966   
United Kingdom 1970 United Kingdom 1970   
United Kingdom 1974 
(February) 
United Kingdom 1974 
(February)   
United Kingdom 1974 
(October) 
United Kingdom 1974 
(October)   
United Kingdom 1979 United Kingdom 1979   
United Kingdom 1983 United Kingdom 1983   
United Kingdom 1987 United Kingdom 1987   
United Kingdom 1992 United Kingdom 1992   
United Kingdom 1997 United Kingdom 1997 United Kingdom 1997 United Kingdom 1997 
United Kingdom 2001 United Kingdom 2001 United Kingdom 2001  
United Kingdom 2005 United Kingdom 2005 United Kingdom 2005 United Kingdom 2005 
United Kingdom 2010 United Kingdom 2010 United Kingdom 2010  
United Kingdom 2015 United Kingdom 2015 United Kingdom 2015 United Kingdom 2015 
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Online appendix B: Robustness checks 
This appendix examines the robustness of the results presented in the main part of the article. It 
tests whether the results hold even when alternative specifications of democratic development and 
ethnic fractionalization are used. In addition to the variable e_democ from the V-Dem data 
(Coppedge et al., 2018) measuring the democratic development, this appendix uses also 
e_fh_ipolity2 from the same dataset. In addition to the measure of ethnic fractionalization by 
Alesina et al. (2003), the tables below examine the effect of the measure developed by Fearon 
(2003). 
The main conclusion of the research presented in the main part is that increasing choice set 
size (i.e. the number of options provided to voters on the ballot) increases the difference between 
the real resulting fragmentation of a party system compared to its expected value for the given set 
of electoral rules. The tables below confirm that the results presented in the main part of the article 
are robust also to the alternative operationalization of the potential confounders. 
In order to simplify the comparison of the tables below, they follow the same structure 
even though some of the variables do not enter the statistical models in every table.  
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Table B.1. Results of robustness check 
 Dependent variable: |𝒅𝒔𝟏| 
 (B1) (B2) (B3) (B4) (B5) 
Manifesto Project      
      
Chapel Hill Expert Survey      
      
Party System Polarization Index      
      
Weighted average number of options (ln) 0.037*** 0.034** 0.031** 0.034** 0.030** 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) 
Average district magnitude   -0.0002 -0.0003* -0.0002 -0.0004 
  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Democratic development   0.002 0.004   
(Variable e_democ from V-Dem data)  (0.008) (0.008)   
Democratic development     0.0004 0.002 
(Variable e_fh_ipolity2 from V-Dem data)    (0.010) (0.011) 
Length of democratic tradition  -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0003 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
GDP per capita  -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 
  (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
Ethnic fractionalization  0.042  0.042  
As measured by Alesina et al. (2003)  (0.067)  (0.067)  
Ethnic fractionalization    0.092  0.091 
As measured by Fearon (2003)   (0.090)  (0.090) 
Constant 0.012 0.021 0.004 0.038 0.019 
 (0.028) (0.081) (0.086) (0.096) (0.102) 
Observations 165 165 165 165 165 
R2 0.110 0.159 0.184 0.158 0.182 
Adjusted R2 0.105 0.127 0.153 0.126 0.151 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; Regression with clustered robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table B.2. Results of robustness check  
 Dependent variable: |𝒅𝑵𝒔| 
 (B6) (B7) (B8) (B9) (B10) 
Manifesto Project      
      
Chapel Hill Expert Survey      
      
Party System Polarization Index      
      
Weighted average number of options (ln) 0.048*** 0.045*** 0.040*** 0.045*** 0.041*** 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) 
Average district magnitude   -0.0002 -0.0003** -0.0001 -0.0003* 
  (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Democratic development   -0.005 -0.003   
(Variable e_democ from V-Dem data)  (0.007) (0.007)   
Democratic development     -0.006 -0.004 
(Variable e_fh_ipolity2 from V-Dem data)    (0.009) (0.009) 
Length of democratic tradition  -0.00002 -0.0002 -0.00002 -0.0002 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
GDP per capita  -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 
  (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
Ethnic fractionalization  0.063  0.063  
As measured by Alesina et al. (2003)  (0.078)  (0.078)  
Ethnic fractionalization    0.127  0.127 
As measured by Fearon (2003)   (0.094)  (0.094) 
Constant -0.007 0.045 0.023 0.052 0.027 
 (0.028) (0.070) (0.070) (0.080) (0.082) 
Observations 165 165 165 165 165 
R2 0.186 0.235 0.279 0.235 0.279 
Adjusted R2 0.181 0.206 0.252 0.206 0.251 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; Regression with clustered robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table B.3. Results of robustness check  
 Dependent variable: |𝒅𝒔𝟏| 
 (B11) (B12) (B13) (B14) (B15) 
Manifesto Project -0.0001 0.0004 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 
 (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) 
Chapel Hill Expert Survey      
      
Party System Polarization Index      
      
Weighted average number of options (ln) 0.043*** 0.033** 0.028 0.032* 0.027 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) 
Average district magnitude   -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0004 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Democratic development   0.005 0.006   
(Variable e_democ from V-Dem data)  (0.009) (0.009)   
Democratic development     0.003 0.005 
(Variable e_fh_ipolity2 from V-Dem data)    (0.011) (0.012) 
Length of democratic tradition  -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0004 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
GDP per capita  -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 
  (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
Ethnic fractionalization  0.048  0.047  
As measured by Alesina et al. (2003)  (0.068)  (0.069)  
Ethnic fractionalization    0.100  0.099 
As measured by Fearon (2003)   (0.093)  (0.094) 
Constant 0.007 -0.009 -0.020 0.007 -0.006 
 (0.032) (0.087) (0.090) (0.101) (0.106) 
Observations 155 155 155 155 155 
R2 0.122 0.167 0.194 0.165 0.192 
Adjusted R2 0.111 0.128 0.156 0.126 0.153 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; Regression with clustered robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table B.4. Results of robustness check 
 Dependent variable: |𝒅𝑵𝒔| 
 (B16) (B17) (B18) (B19) (B20) 
Manifesto Project -0.0001 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Chapel Hill Expert Survey      
      
Party System Polarization Index      
      
Weighted average number of options (ln) 0.051*** 0.042** 0.035** 0.042** 0.035** 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Average district magnitude  -0.0002 -0.0004* -0.0002 -0.0004* 
  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Democratic development   -0.001 0.0002   
(Variable e_democ from V-Dem data)  (0.007) (0.007)   
Democratic development     -0.002 0.0001 
(Variable e_fh_ipolity2 from V-Dem data)    (0.008) (0.009) 
Length of democratic tradition  -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0003 
  (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
GDP per capita  -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 
  (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
Ethnic fractionalization  0.069  0.068  
As measured by Alesina et al. (2003)  (0.081)  (0.081)  
Ethnic fractionalization    0.136  0.136 
As measured by Fearon (2003)   (0.099)  (0.099) 
Constant -0.010 0.016 0.002 0.019 0.002 
 (0.030) (0.077) (0.076) (0.083) (0.085) 
Observations 155 155 155 155 155 
R2 0.180 0.230 0.278 0.230 0.278 
Adjusted R2 0.169 0.193 0.243 0.193 0.243 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; Regression with clustered robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table B.5. Results of robustness check 
 Dependent variable: |𝒅𝒔𝟏| 
 (B21) (B22) (B23) (B24) (B25) 
Manifesto Project      
      
Chapel Hill Expert Survey -0.005 -0.009 -0.007 -0.009 -0.008 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) 
Party System Polarization Index      
      
Weighted average number of options (ln) 0.025*** 0.027*** 0.026*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) 
Average district magnitude  0.0003** 0.0003*** 0.0001 0.0002 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Democratic development   -0.001 0.001   
(Variable e_democ from V-Dem data)  (0.022) (0.023)   
Democratic development     0.048 0.048 
(Variable e_fh_ipolity2 from V-Dem data)    (0.042) (0.042) 
Length of democratic tradition  0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 
  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) 
GDP per capita  -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 
  (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
Ethnic fractionalization  -0.043  -0.031  
As measured by Alesina et al. (2003)  (0.076)  (0.084)  
Ethnic fractionalization    -0.021  -0.015 
As measured by Fearon (2003)   (0.063)  (0.060) 
Constant 0.062 0.090 0.059 -0.362 -0.381 
 (0.068) (0.237) (0.253) (0.417) (0.412) 
Observations 52 52 52 52 52 
R2 0.120 0.160 0.157 0.193 0.191 
Adjusted R2 0.084 0.026 0.023 0.065 0.063 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; Regression with clustered robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table B.6. Results of robustness check 
 Dependent variable: |𝒅𝑵𝒔| 
 (B26) (B27) (B28) (B29) (B30) 
Manifesto Project      
      
Chapel Hill Expert Survey -0.008 -0.005 -0.006 -0.009 -0.010 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
Party System Polarization Index      
      
Weighted average number of options (ln) 0.026*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
Average district magnitude  -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Democratic development   0.028 0.028   
(Variable e_democ from V-Dem data)  (0.023) (0.024)   
Democratic development     0.073** 0.072** 
(Variable e_fh_ipolity2 from V-Dem data)    (0.031) (0.031) 
Length of democratic tradition  0.00002 -0.00003 0.0001 0.0001 
  (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
GDP per capita  0.00000 0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 
  (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
Ethnic fractionalization  0.045  0.028  
As measured by Alesina et al. (2003)  (0.073)  (0.073)  
Ethnic fractionalization    0.032  0.018 
As measured by Fearon (2003)   (0.056)  (0.053) 
Constant 0.078 -0.240 -0.224 -0.628** -0.614** 
 (0.053) (0.228) (0.236) (0.306) (0.290) 
Observations 52 52 52 52 52 
R2 0.137 0.192 0.192 0.236 0.236 
Adjusted R2 0.101 0.064 0.063 0.115 0.114 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; Regression with clustered robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table B.7. Results of robustness check 
 Dependent variable: |𝒅𝒔𝟏| 
 (B31) (B32) (B33) (B34) (B35) 
Manifesto Project      
      
Chapel Hill Expert Survey      
      
Party System Polarization Index -0.007 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.015) 
Weighted average number of options (ln) 0.041*** 0.051*** 0.050*** 0.051*** 0.050*** 
 (0.015) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) 
Average district magnitude  0.00000 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0003 
  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Democratic development   0.026* 0.030**   
(Variable e_democ from V-Dem data)  (0.014) (0.015)   
Democratic development     0.026 0.033 
(Variable e_fh_ipolity2 from V-Dem data)    (0.031) (0.034) 
Length of democratic tradition  0.0004 0.0003 0.0004 0.0003 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
GDP per capita  -0.00000* -0.00000* -0.00000* -0.00000* 
  (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
Ethnic fractionalization  0.067  0.068  
As measured by Alesina et al. (2003)  (0.083)  (0.087)  
Ethnic fractionalization    0.113  0.111 
As measured by Fearon (2003)   (0.089)  (0.094) 
Constant 0.013 -0.238 -0.288* -0.234 -0.310 
 (0.047) (0.153) (0.162) (0.307) (0.329) 
Observations 55 55 55 55 55 
R2 0.158 0.296 0.338 0.266 0.304 
Adjusted R2 0.126 0.191 0.239 0.157 0.200 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; Regression with clustered robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table B.8. Results of robustness check 
 Dependent variable: |𝒅𝑵𝒔| 
 (B36) (B37) (B38) (B39) (B40) 
Manifesto Project      
      
Chapel Hill Expert Survey      
      
Party System Polarization Index -0.015 -0.013 -0.012 -0.013 -0.012 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014) 
Weighted average number of options (ln) 0.051*** 0.054*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.052*** 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.013) (0.017) (0.013) 
Average district magnitude  -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0004 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Democratic development   0.006 0.012   
(Variable e_democ from V-Dem data)  (0.014) (0.014)   
Democratic development     -0.003 0.006 
(Variable e_fh_ipolity2 from V-Dem data)    (0.026) (0.028) 
Length of democratic tradition  0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
GDP per capita  -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 
  (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
Ethnic fractionalization  0.118  0.116  
As measured by Alesina et al. (2003)  (0.083)  (0.084)  
Ethnic fractionalization    0.166**  0.162** 
As measured by Fearon (2003)   (0.079)  (0.082) 
Constant 0.028 -0.049 -0.114 0.038 -0.057 
 (0.049) (0.162) (0.165) (0.268) (0.280) 
Observations 55 55 55 55 55 
R2 0.237 0.367 0.423 0.365 0.415 
Adjusted R2 0.208 0.272 0.337 0.270 0.328 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; Regression with clustered robust standard errors in parentheses 
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